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ABSTRACT
GENDER MATTERS: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE LEADERSHIP
KYLIE BRAEGELMANN
2017

Women remain conspicuously underrepresented at the highest levels of corporate
management; thus, it seems, gender matters. Gender bias in financial markets would
imply an inefficient market, which necessarily constrains economic performance and
social welfare more generally. To measure gender bias, I examine the cumulative
abnormal returns around CEO announcements from 1992 through 2016 using a modified
event study methodology. Existing event studies in this field are inconclusive as to
whether or not such a bias exists. Therefore, this research contributes to the literature by
extending the data, using a larger event window, and studying bias over time and firm
size. I find that the market reacts differently to female CEOs in all three cases: a
difference of negative 54 basis points in a pooled study, between negative 202 and
positive 204 basis points when measured over time, and as much as negative 250 basis
points when analyzed by firm size. Moreover, I analyze firm performance data for the
same firms, concluding that returns are not conditional on gender. Market perception of
difference between male and female performance is irrational.

1

1. Introduction
Women remain conspicuously underrepresented at the highest levels of corporate
management. As Figure 1 illustrates, in 1992, only 0.25 percent of newly announced
chief executive officers were female. Over 20 years later, in 2016, female CEO
announcements comprised just 4.74 percent of the total newly announced executives in
the EXECUCOMP database. The reasons for this continued underrepresentation are
longstanding, complicated, and controversial. I surmise that gender bias in financial
markets plays a role in maintaining this glass ceiling.
Figure 1: CEO Composition by Gender

The goal of this research is to determine whether financial markets react to CEO
gender. I reason that if gender matters in this way, then I should be able to measure the
effect of CEO gender in terms of stock returns, which reflect the financial market’s
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expectations of future corporate earnings; I refer to this measure as the gender bias. Such
a bias, were it to exist, would question the efficiency of the market. A theory attributed to
how effectively the market reacts to announcements, the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH), suggests that investors act rationally based on all available information. Investors
attempt to maximize return, but investors cannot “beat the market” in the long run. Thus,
persistent differences in returns reveal investors’ systematic perceptions of CEO ability,
which is conditional on gender in this study. To measure this gender bias, I examine
stock returns around CEO announcements using event study methodology. Furthermore, I
analyze firm performance after the announcement to measure whether returns are
conditional on gender. The latter analysis allows me to put the market reaction in context
of actual performance by the same CEOs. This research question is important, because a
gender bias in financial markets would imply an inefficient allocation of capital, which
necessarily constrains economic performance and social welfare more generally.
I use event study methodology to examine 100 female CEO announcements and a
comparative random matched sample based on similar announcement dates and firm
sizes for 102 male CEO announcements, all between 1992 through 2016. I obtained CEO
data from EXECUCOMP, securities information from CRSP, and firm financials from
COMPUSTAT. I gathered CEO announcement dates through searches of LEXISNEXIS.
Some studies such as Lee and James (2007) and Lucy and Carron (2011) limited their
event study investigation to a relatively short window. However, I use a methodology
similar to that used in Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009): I extend the event window to
fifteen days prior to the event and ten days after the event to capture potentially more
reaction to CEO announcements.
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By estimating the cumulative abnormal returns using the Fama-French threefactor model, I ask three questions about market efficiency and gender bias. I define
gender bias as a difference from returns associated with male CEO announcements. This
bias can be in either direction from male returns, as there is no existing consensus about
which direction the bias would take. First, I ask if gender bias exists when all
announcements are pooled. Second, I ask if gender bias varies over time. Third, I ask if
gender bias varies by firm size. A randomly matched male sample allows me to compare
means (of cumulative abnormal returns) to determine whether the market reacts
differently to female CEO announcements. I find the effect of gender is significant across
all three dimensions. Specifically, I find that cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
associated with male matched CEO announcements are about 50 basis points greater than
CARs associated with female CEO announcements; and this difference was greatest in
the late 1990s, when male CEO announcements led to 702 basis point CAR versus a 230
basis point CAR for female CEO announcements. Furthermore, female CEO
announcements by S&P 500 and Mid-Cap firms led to CARs that were higher than those
for their male counterparts. I conclude that market participants reveal a gender bias.
Furthermore, by regressing ROA on firm financial ratios and CEO gender, I conclude
that returns are not conditional on gender. These regression results contextualize the
event study results: the market expects female performance to be different than male, but
this assumption is incorrect, irrational, and inefficient.
I contribute the extant literature in the following ways: first, I study gender bias
over a relatively long period of time; doing so allows me a larger sample size and a larger
sampling of firms at different asset-size levels for female CEOs and their male
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counterparts. Perhaps, a drawback of Lucey and Carron (2011) was that they only
focused on larger firms, those included in the FTSE 100 for example. In constrast, I
identify four categories of firms by their sizes. As such, I am able to test whether gender
bias affects the sampling universe of firms. Second, I extend the event study window to
capture potentially more market reaction to CEO announcements, much like Coxbill,
Sanning, and Schaffer (2009) do; I reason the relatively short windows used by Lee and
James (2007) and Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009) do not adequately capture
market reaction. Third, in addition to a single aggregated event study, I study CEO
announcements by time period and by firm size. This is important because it allows me to
decompose the pooled data on CEO announcements and, thus, test if gender bias was a
mere fad or a systematic feature of the financial market. Finally, I determine that returns
are not conditional on gender.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: in section two, I discuss the
extant literature and what I contribute to it. In section three, I describe my datasets and
methodology. In section four, I report my event-study results. In section five, I build on
my results by comparing actual CEO performance of male and female executives; to do
so, I estimate regressions based on the panel data of firms I analyze in my event study.
Finally, in sections six and seven, I propose questions for future research and conclude.
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2. Literature Review
Measuring bias of any kind is inherently difficult. Generally, people are not
inclined to admit their biases; the reasons why interweave intellectual contributions from
economics with those from sociology and psychology. To begin, I review the
foundational literature on gender bias. Then, I review studies of gender biases in
financial markets. Finally, I assess the state of event study research in corporate finance
and gender bias. I conclude with a concise summary.
2.1 Evidence of Gender Bias
Gender relations—and, thus, gender biases—are, clearly, as old as the human race
itself. Nevertheless, research in this area began in earnest in the 1970s as women joined
the workforce in greater numbers than before. The influential sociology paper by
Rosabeth Kanter of Harvard University shed light on why the bias may exist regardless of
female ability. Kanter (1977) frames the problem of gender bias in the workplace as an
outcome of minority-majority group dynamics, or tokenism. The author focuses on
successful women in male-dominated workplaces, including those at the very top of the
business world. Kanter demonstrates that when females are in a token position—one that
is rare or novel, nearly alone—they are likely to face a three-fold double standard:
namely, additional performance pressure, heightened group boundaries, and entrapped
roles (1977). Of these standards, which increase the likelihood that a woman will reach
the highest echelons of management, role entrapment is most relevant to my research,
because it explains how outsiders could have warped perceptions of female CEOs.
Because female CEOs are tokens, outsiders are likely to stereotype female CEOs in ways
that conform to male-dominant social norms. For example, role entrapment implies,
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“[M]aking adjustments in perception of the token's professional role to fit the expected
position of the token's category- that is, bringing situational status in line with master
status, the token's social type” (1977). As such, investors may perceive the female CEO
as woman first, businessperson second—a warped view of a CEO’s leadership and
financial savvy. Because investors make investment decisions based on perceived risk
characteristics, some of which are subjective, a systematic perception of the token
femaleness of a CEO will cloud market perception of CEO ability.
Empirical findings support this theory. For example, Oakley (2000) asserts that
when female executives tried to affect camaraderie with higher, male executives, they
“triggered associations among male executives that prompted them to associate the
female executives with other women in their lives, such as their wives, daughters, and
secretaries” (2000). This finding is further evidence that role entrapment is a real
phenomenon, particularly in the executive suite. Indeed, when female executives sought
to gain confidence by acting chummy with their male executive counterparts, the male
executives stereotyped female executives all the more.
Furthermore, other sociological research shows that when a minority is hired, they
are likely to be perceived as less competent by others. In their paper regarding affirmative
action and its stigma, Heilman, Block, and Stathatos (1997) note that when an
individual’s hiring or promotion is perceived as an affirmative action, others view the
individual as less capable. The authors assert that “people resist relinquishing a negative
view of those associated with affirmative action; such individuals seem to remain
incompetent in the minds of onlookers unless they are proved to be competent” (1997).
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This means that token individuals are not only incorrectly judged; the warped perception
may be pervasive and long lasting.
Token theory lays the groundwork for understanding how gender bias could affect
market perception of female CEOs. Specifically, female CEOs, simply because of their
gender, are held to a different standard; and, their paucity in corporate leadership could
further warp market perceptions. Therefore, it is essential to answer the question: Do
female CEOs generally perform similarly to male CEOs? If women underperform
relative to men, then perhaps the bias is a rational reaction to information. If perceptions
are warped by gender, and women and men perform similarly, biased financial-market
evaluations likely exist.
2.2 CEOs: Performance and Gender
Huang and Kisgen (2013) study leadership decisions—especially those regarding
significant financial issues—by male and female CEOs. The authors discuss genderspecific behaviors and use panel data to identify differences in financial decision making
between male and female CEOs. Huang and Kisgen conclude that "Firms with female
executives are less likely to make acquisitions and are less likely to issue debt than firms
with male executives … this empirical evidence is consistent with men being
overconfident relative to women” (2013). In their study, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find
that women make better, more consistent financial decisions for their shareholders.
Powell and Ansic (1997) find that women differ from men both in risk propensity
and financial strategy. In a controlled experiment, the authors assign different tasks to
male and female business students. They find that men and women differ by gender in
risk aversion and strategies regardless of contextual influence. However, critically,
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Powell and Ansic (1997) find, “[N]o significant differences between males and females
in their ability to perform in financial decisionmaking. However, females were more
likely to attribute their performance to good luck and were less confident than males for a
similar level of prior experience and education” (1997). This study elucidates two points:
first, there is no difference in performance, regardless of differences in risk aversion and
strategy. Second, successful females are less confident and take less credit than their male
counterparts.
Khan and Vieito (2013) also find that female leadership is positively related to
firm performance. The authors study return on assets and stock volatility. The authors
conclude that, “Our results reveal new insights in the area: firms with female CEOs are
associated with an increase in performance compared to the firms managed by male
CEOs. I also find that when the CEO is a woman, the firm risk level is smaller than when
the CEO is a man” (2013). These findings are consistent with Powell and Ansic (1997),
supporting the idea that female executives are more risk averse, but maintain positive
firm performance.
Using a different measurement method, Dezso and Ross (2013) find that femaleled companies perform as well as male-led companies that manage investment portfolios.
Finding that innovative companies are also more likely to have women in the upper
echelons of management, Dezso and Ross (2013) find that returns on assets, returns on
equity, and Tobin’s Q—total market value to total book value—are higher for firms led
by female executives. This too supports the idea that female executives, while relatively
rare, should not be stereotyped as financially inferior. They conclude that female-led
companies perform as well as male-led companies that manage investment portfolios;
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moreover, innovative companies are more likely to have women in the upper echelons of
management.
In a related literature, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) assert that female fund
managers invest similarly to male fund managers, underscoring similar financial
competence across gender. In an analysis of fixed-income mutual fund managers, they
take care to note the consensus (in the extant literature on gender risk aversion) that
women are generally more risk averse and less confident in financial decisions. Based on
this consensus view, they design a study of mutual fund managers that focuses on
financial know-how and opportunity. The authors assert that, “Our results suggest that
differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may instead be attributable
to finance knowledge and wealth constraints”, which implies that females and males with
similar education and career preparation should perform similarly.
The firm-performance literature finds that female-led firms grow at steadier rates
(Huang and Kisgen 2013), have higher ROA and lower stock volatility (Khan and Vieito
2013), and have positive performance measures relative to men (Dezso and Ross 2008).
While some papers assert that risk aversion and strategy differ by gender (Powell and
Ansic 1997), others find that females invest similarly to males (Atkinson, Baird, and Frye
2003). Though the existing literature generally concludes that females are slightly more
risk averse, it firmly supports that female executives are as financially capable as their
male counterparts. See Appendix A for a concise summary of the comparativeperformance literature.
2.3 Methods of Measuring Gender Bias
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If male and female executives have equal financial ability, then market reaction
should reflect this similarity. If the market reacts differently to female CEOs, it would
reveal that the market misperceives ability based on gender. This difference can move in
either direction; any difference in perception could be considered a bias. There are two
common ways to measure gender bias in the financial market. The first way analyzes
stock returns in the long run to discover if female executives are consistently viewed
differently over time. The second way, which has received a fair amount of academic and
popular attention in the last few years, is to study stock returns around the day a firm
announces its appointment of a female CEO. This second way—the event-study
method—is the one I take in my research.
2.3.1. Long-run Return Measures
An early attempt to measure stock returns conditional on CEO gender appears in
Wolfers (2006). The author outlines some of the problems with measuring
discrimination, and proposes a way to overcome these problems. According to Wolfers,
“Although explicit prediction markets on the performance of male and female managers
do not exist, in equity markets traders do take large positions based at least partly on their
assessments of the ability of the CEO” (2006). In his literature review, Wolfers provides
the rationale for gender discrimination research by noting that corporate finance research
identifies CEO characteristics as important for returns (2006). The author analyzes
Execomp data to track S&P 1500 firms from 1992-2004. Measuring long-term stock
returns and using Fama-Macbeth regressions, the author is unable to reject his null
hypothesis that “financial markets do not systematically under-estimate female-led firms”
(Wolfers 2006). Wolfers concludes that more data are needed to find a statistically
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significant relationship. The paucity of female CEOs is a widely acknowledged problem
in this literature.
Wolfers (2016) is not without critics. Koley (2012) notes that Wolfers’ use of
calendar measurement produces significantly skewed results because calendar measures
treat all months the same, regardless of how the proportion of female CEOs varies across
months. Koley (2012) concludes that female CEOs consistently underperform relative to
male CEOs. He suggests three reasons why: circularity in results (shareholders’ price
beliefs could result in a self-fulfilling prophecy), the long-term nature of the problem, and
affirmative action (Koley 2012). In any case, the author dismisses bias as a possible
explanation. An additional summary of this literature can be found in Appendix A.
2.3.2. Event Study Methodology
Measuring gender bias poses several econometric challenges, including
measurement bias, endogeneity, and small sample sizes. Event study methodology, which
was introduced by Fama et al. (1969), allows researchers to understand the repercussions
of a specific event. Using stock splits as the event, Fama et al. (1969) laid out an
empirical framework that changed the field of corporate finance. Event study
methodology allows researchers to control for general market returns and risk factors in
order to study the isolated effect of CEO announcements or other such unusual events.
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) underpins this methodology: assuming
the market uses all available information, the return patterns around an anticipated event
reflect new information regarding the outcome of the event. According to Basu (1997),
the efficient market hypothesis asserts that, “security prices fully reflect all available
information in a rapid and unbiased fashion, and thus provide unbiased estimates of the
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underlying values.” In this instance, the announcement of a new CEO gives the market a
plethora of new information. According to EMH, the market reacts quickly and without
bias. However, a gender pricing bias, were it to exist, would imply market inefficiency
because the investors would misperceive information. For gender bias to exist, the market
must react systematically differently to male and female CEOs. This difference can move
in either direction; the bias is defined as a different reaction, as the market should have no
reason to assume either gender to be superior to the other.
Furthermore, Beechey, Gruen, and Vickery (2000) assert that EMH “implies that
the market processes information rationally, in the sense that relevant information is not
ignored, and systematic errors are not made”. A systematic error, such as consistently
undervaluing female CEO performance, would imply an inefficient market. Therefore,
the event of a CEO announcement allows me to measure whether or not markets react
rationally to announcements of female executives.
To determine whether a CEO change is a significant event that would affect firm
performance and thus returns, Beatty and Zajac (1987) use advanced statistical methods
and relatively large sample sizes. According to the authors, CEO succession significantly
affects returns of large corporations; put differently, a change in CEO affects firm
valuation.
To examine the effect on firm valuation of a female CEO announcement, Lee and
James (2007) draw on the theory of tokenism developed in Kanter (1977) to explain why
firms and markets would, in principle, negatively react to the announcement of a female
CEO appointment. They also test a variety of hypotheses about executive appointments,
and use linguistic technology to analyze the language used in female CEO
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announcements. To measure abnormal returns, they use the event study method, and find
a significant difference between returns around male and female announcements over the
three-day cumulative return window. They also use a simple multivariate regression
model to measure these returns, controlling for other factors, and find evidence to support
the hypothesis that markets react more negatively to female CEO appointments.
However, they recognize that there are relatively few female CEOs: thus, a small sample
size makes it difficult to draw more general conclusions.
Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009) also use event study methodology to
analyze market reactions to CEO announcements across gender. The authors seek
answers to two questions. First, does CEO gender affect valuation? Second, does it affect
firm risk-taking? They measure the market reaction to a female CEO versus a male CEO
to learn if there is an abnormal market reaction. (2009). Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams
study announcements by compiling data from LexisNexis, CRSP, and CompuStat. They
use Fama-French industry classifications to create 70 matched-sample CEO appointments
in order to control for all other risk factors. They evaluate three measures: returns, beta,
and idiosyncratic risk, each for a twelve-month period centered on the announcement
date; they also use a three day window to test for abnormal returns. They find no
statistically significant difference. Additionally, they measure CEO gender and risk. They
conclude that, “[O]ur evidence supports the proposition that the market judges female
CEOs as more risk averse than male CEOs … firms with relatively high total risk or
relatively high idiosyncratic risk are more likely to appoint female CEOs, who may be
more averse to risk, so that these risks might decrease” (2009). However, in focusing on
market reactions to CEO announcements, they find no statistically significant difference.
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Lucey and Carron (2011) follow up on Lee and James (2007). They use a similar
methodology to examine director appointments, including CEO appointments, within the
FTSE 100. They use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to predict expected return
and use a three-day window to measure CAR. Lucey and Carron (2011) conclude, “[T]he
stock market reacts against females appointed to the male-dominated roles of executive
director and CEO, but that the role of nonexecutive director is regarded as suitable for
either gender”. According to their study results, the market perceives females as equal to
males for management jobs, but it does not perceive them as equal for the very highest
levels of leadership.
In contrast, Gondhalekar and Dalmia (2007) analyze Russell 3000 data (with a
sample size of 50) and use a matched-sample method to find no statistically significant
difference between market reactions to male and female CEO announcements. Like Lee
and James (2007), Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009), and Lucey and Carron
(2011), the authors also use a three-day window to measure abnormal returns.
Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009) extend the window used by most other event
studies, extending the window to 20 days before and 20 days after the event. They
investigate female-to-male announcements in comparison to male-to-male
announcements. They use three benchmark models to measure CAR: Fama French,
market, and market adjusted. Within their window, Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009)
find no difference between male and female CEO announcements. See Appendix B for a
summary of the referenced event study literature.
2.4 Contribution
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Gender bias is a complicated issue, especially in the context of financial markets.
As I summarize in Appendix B, studies based on event-study methodology are
inconclusive about the existence of a gender bias. In this thesis, I make three
contributions to this literature. First, I analyze a larger data set than previous studies.
Second, I posit that the three-day window used for cumulative abnormal returns is
insufficient. It is possible that highly efficient markets would react to murmurings of a
CEO change before it is officially announced; conversely, it is possible that if markets are
less efficient, it may react to CARs with a lag following the event. Following studies like
Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009), I increase the event window to a 26-day period. A
longer window is more likely to capture a financial market bias.
Finally, in addition to the larger sample size and increased window, female CEO
announcements have never been analyzed across time periods, such as, say, the 1990s or
the 2000s. Similarly, these announcements have not been separated into firm size groups
and studied comparatively. Thus, I study market reactions to announcements segmented
by firm size, as represented by their respective S&P indices. With these three
contributions in mind, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then gender bias will not be
evident in the market
This hypothesis is the general hypothesis that most researchers, including Lee and
James (2007), Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009), and Lucey and Carron (2011),
Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009), Gonhalekar and Dalmia (2007), test. To test this
hypothesis, I use the entire sample of female CEOs and compare their CARs with those
of the entire sample of male CEOs over the full sample period from 1992-2016. To reject
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this hypothesis, male and female CAR must be significantly different from each other in
either direction.

Hypothesis 2: If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then gender bias will not be
evident in the market when firms are grouped by years
Testing this hypothesis allows me to analyze stock market reactions in different
periods of time. By measuring CAR for each gender in each year period, I am able to
analyze how the gender differential changes over time. Just as in Hypothesis 1, to reject
this hypothesis, male and female CAR must be significantly different from each other in
either direction.

Hypothesis 3: If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then gender bias will not be
evident in the market when firms are grouped by size

Hypothesis 3 is another way to measure biased stock market reactions. By
grouping firms by relative size as indicated by S&P indices, I am able to measure how
bias changes across firm size. For example, the CAR differential may be larger for large
firms relative to small firms. Again, to reject this hypothesis, male and female CAR must
be significantly different from each other in either direction.
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3. Model, Methodology, and Data
Because of the scope and difficulty of the proposed research, including the
econometrical challenges it poses, I closely follow the precedent set by Fama et al. (1969)
event study methodology, as well as the model laid out in Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer
(2009). As I explained in the literature review, market reaction to female-CEO
announcements is unclear. Lee and James (2006) and Lucey and Carron (2011) find
statistical significance to support gender bias through the mechanism of market reaction;
however, other studies do not.
3.1 Conceptual Background and Event Study Methodology
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) holds that the market reflects all available
information about the prospects of firms. The central theme of information implies that
market reactions are, at best, inconsequential. Investors with diverse preferences should
not react uniformly to female CEOs, thus EMH implies that gender should not affect
stock performance. According to Fama (1998) “apparent overreaction to information is
about as common as underreaction,” meaning that reactions should not affect returns in
the long run. As such, CEO gender should not affect stock performance in the long run.
While the theory of EMH explains why CEO gender should not affect firm
returns, the theory of tokenism in Kanter (1977) explains why stereotypes of female
ability may lead to warped perceptions, creating market inefficiencies. Kanter studies the
relative proportions of female and male colleagues and the effects on perception. She
demonstrates that when females are underrepresented, they are likely to face a variety of
difficulties, including role entrapment. According to Kanter, role entrapment is, “the
distortion of the characteristics of tokens to fit preexisting generalizations about their
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category” (1977). In the case of executive management, the distribution of gender is
heavily skewed toward men. Investors make decisions based on all relevant information;
therefore, it is likely that female stereotypes will affect perceptions of firm prospects
when women lead these firms.
Given this premise, an event study methodology is sensible because it quantifies
the impact of an event on firm stock performance. As I explained earlier, if the market is
efficient, CEO gender should not affect market reaction to the specific event. However,
there is ample evidence that warped perceptions of female ability will, in fact, create
market inefficiencies when a female CEO is announced. Event study methodology allows
me to analyze how the specifics of the particular event can effect investor perception and
expectations.

3.2 Model
Conceptually, event study analysis relies on measures of firm-level expected and
actual returns. Expected returns – also known as normal returns - are those a firm would
have achieved had the analyzed event not taken place; actual returns reflect the event.
The difference between an actual and an expected return is, by definition, an abnormal
return. The different analytical techniques for estimating abnormal returns differ with
respect to the model used for predicting the expected returns around the event date. In
Equation 1, I specify the sample regression function of the Fama-French 3-Factor model
that I use in this study:
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To estimate the risk model surrounding my announcement dates, I specify the
length of the estimation period in trading days over which I estimate the risk model
(Equation 1). My estimation period is 250 calendar days, with at least 200 days of trading
activity. I also have a gap period of 20 days prior to my event window, for a total of 270
days. My event window is 15 days before to 10 days after the event, for a total of 26
days. To measure the total impact of an event over a particular period of time -- the event
window – I sum the abnormal returns for the 26 days in the event window. I measure
these cumulative abnormal returns as specified in Equation 4.
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I compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each CEO announcement
either by year, firm size, or one pooled group. Finally, I run a simple comparison of
means to determine whether the mean CAR for female announcements is significantly
different than the mean CAR for male announcements in each study. For this mean test, I
measure mean CAR for each gender group as specified in Equation 5.
(' =

∑.
-/0 , 1

(5)

I compare the mean CAR for gender groups using a t-test mean comparison.
Because it is possible that the male and female sample have unequal variances, I use
Welch’s Approximation for degrees of freedom.
3.3 Data
All executive-related data are from EXECUCOMP, which is the premier
executive compensation database. EXECUCOMP is produced by Wharton Research Data
Services (WRDS) and contains comprehensive data on the top five executives for all
S&P 1500 firms, as well as some other firms. EXECUCOMP contains annual data from
1992 to 2016, as well as some observations before 1992. Securities information is from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), which I access using EVNTSTUDY
software. Firm financials come from COMPUSTAT, which I access using WRDS. In
addition, to examine market behavior around announcements, I gathered CEO
announcement dates through searches of LEXISNEXIS using relevant Boolean search
terms.
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3.3.1. Data Sorting and Sample Construction
I began with full EXECUCOMP database of 273,478 observations. In this
research, it is critical to compare similar firms in order to most closely study gender.
Therefore, in order to study firms with relatively similar market structures, I removed
utilities firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). I
removed these firms because utilities firms have a unique financial and regulatory
structure; furthermore, returns for financial firms are not appropriate for comparison with
non-financial firms. After removing both utilities and financial firms, 228,048 executive
observations remained. Because EXECUCOMP includes data for many top management
positions, after removing irrelevant non-CEO observations, 36,249 CEO observations
remained.
To construct the female sample, I removed all male announcements. I then filtered
annual observations so that each executive-company combination was represented only
once. Doing so produced a list of 156 female CEOs and their corresponding executive
data. Finally, I dropped the records of CEOs announced before 1992 because of
incomplete or inadequate information. Thus, at the start of my event study, the sample
size was 152 female CEOs. However, because 52 observations were coded with incorrect
CUSIPs or inadequate securities data, my final female sample size of female CEO
announcements numbered 100.
To construct the male sample, I used a random matching methodology. From the
pool of EXECUCOMP CEO data, I removed the 869 female observations, after which
35,560 male CEO observations remained. For each female CEO announcement, I used
STATA to randomly select a male CEO appointed in the same year. Doing so resulted in
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a random matched sample based on appointment year. As with the female group, some
male observations did not have adequate information to complete the event study. The
final male CEO announcements matched sample size numbered 102.

3.3.2 Firm Characteristics
In my dataset, the characteristics of female- and male-led firms are similar. In
Table 1 I demonstrate the similarity between male and female led firms in the matched
sample.

Table 1: Firm Financial Information
summary statistics on the companies with female vs. male CEOs

Mean Firm Financial Information
Total Assets
Return on Assets
Tobin's Q
Leverage Ratio
Number of CEOs

Male
6231.39
0.029
2.147
0.224
100

Female
7364.531
0.029
2.309
0.199
102

While female-led firms are slightly larger in this sample, the main financial ratios
are very similar for both gendered samples. Return on assets (ROA) is exactly equal for
male- and female-led firms. The female-led firms have a slightly higher mean Tobin’s Q
of 2.309 relative to the male-led-firm mean of 2.147, but the two are roughly similar. The
mean leverage ratio for the female-led firms is slightly lower than that for the male-led
firms; however, both near 0.20. In Table 2 I report that the female-led firms and the
randomly matched male-led firms are similar for the purposes of my research in this
thesis.
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Comparing CARs in the male and female samples by firm industry classification
is another approach. Firm industry classification is listed by SIC in EXECUCOMP.
These SIC codes effectively reveal industries most commonly led by male or female
executives. For the purposes of this study, I use general SIC code categories that I list in
Table 2.

Table 2: SIC Code Categories
Industry
Agriculture &
Forestry

SIC codes

Mining

0999-1999

Construction

1500-1799

Manufacturing

2000-3999

Transportation &
Communication

4000-4899

Wholesale Trade

500051999

Retail Trade

5200-5999

Services

7000-8999

Public
Administration &
Other

9000

0-0999

Recall that I dropped all utilities firms (SIC 4900-4999) and financial services
firms (SIC 6000-6999) from the sample because the returns of these (uniquely regulated)
firms would not be appropriate to compare to the returns of other firms in the market.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the industry composition of the male and female samples.
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Figure 2: Industry Composition by SIC
Male Sample

Female Sample

As I illustrate in Figure 2, the largest industry sector in both the male and female
samples is manufacturing. At 57.14 percent, this sector comprises a slightly larger
component of the male sample than the female sample, for which the value is 46.08
percent. For the male sample, the next largest sector is services, while the second largest
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for the female sample is retail. However, services comprise a larger percentage of the
female sample, at 21.57 percent; the corresponding male sample value is 17.14. Figure 2
illustrates that industry composition differs slightly between the male and female
samples; this is primarily because female CEOs are more concentrated in manufacturing,
retail, and services, while the male sample is concentrated largely in manufacturing.
3.3.3 CEO Characteristics
When measuring gender bias in an event study, not only is it important to have
similar firm characteristics; executive characteristics and compensation should also be
comparable. In Table 2, I summarize relevant CEO characteristics and compensation data
found in EXECUCOMP. For more detailed explanation of each characteristic, see
Appendix C.
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Table 3: Executive Summary Data
Female Sample
salary
bonus
age
total
compensation
length
all other
compensation
change CEO
payment
equity incentive
plan value
fair value of
options
executive
director
other
compensation
value of stock
awards
pct. shares
outstanding
estimated
termination
payment
percent increase
in salary
compensation in
SEC filing

Male Sample

Male Sampling Population

mean
772.6
234.5
53.6

median
698.9
0.0
54.0

Std.Dev.
402.1
615.2
6.5

mean
778.5
303.9
54.1

median
715.9
0.0
54.0

Std.Dev.
346.5
691.0
7.8

mean
709.8
397.0
54.9

median
650.0
0.0
55.0

Std.Dev.
393.7
1131.0
7.2

5259.5
6.4

2949.8
2.6

6256.4
8.0

5269.2
10.3

3701.8
6.8

4883.6
11.2

5151.9
9.4

2975.0
5.1

8967.5
10.7

54.4

13.7

92.0

244.5

10.4

976.8

168.3

17.3

1230.3

15132.5

5505.8

26534.2

14708.6

9309.6

16971.3

13109.6

7279.7

19978.0

3704.8

265.4

7343.6

4410.8

403.3

7745.5

2849.2

0.0

7490.3

809.9

0.0

1970.1

1115.8

312.9

1964.5

1170.6

247.1

2558.8

1.0

1.0

0.2

1.0

1.0

0.1

1.0

1.0

0.2

220.2

57.2

593.4

245.1

56.1

655.0

265.5

46.9

1676.2

2739.9

893.0

3633.0

2524.5

1420.9

3309.2

2142.7

1037.7

3421.0

2.2

0.5

8.0

0.8

0.4

1.2

2.7

1.0

6.4

7430.0

2401.9

11049.2

5104.5

1066.7

8876.1

6841.1

2000.0

16062.8

70.2

4.7

331.1

30.7

5.4

96.3

26.2

4.9

242.8

6517.8

3528.6

7046.1

6572.8

4304.7

5942.0

6083.1

4018.3

7028.5
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Table 3 is a comprehensive summary of executive compensation data from
EXECUCOMP. For simplicity, I break these data into two sections: personal CEO
characteristics and compensation characteristics. CEO characteristics in this dataset are
similar across genders. For example, the mean age of female CEOs is 53.6 years, which
is almost identical to the mean age of male CEOS of 54.1 years. Similarly, male and
female CEOs are equally likely to serve as executive directors. However, male CEOs
have more average years of experience with a firm, which is a noteworthy result. In
addition, female CEOs own a mean of 2.22 percent of total shares outstanding. In
contrast, male CEOs own a mean of just 0.83 percent of total shares outstanding. See
Figure 3 for an illustration of CEO characteristics.
Figure 3: CEO Characteristics by Gender
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Some of the measures of CEO compensation reveal male and female CEOs to be
similar; for example, mean female CEO annual salary is $772.59 thousand compared to
the male mean salary of $778.47 thousand. Similarly, “other compensation” is similar
between genders, with the female average of $220.20 thousand compared to the slightly
higher male average of $245.32 thousand. Female bonuses are slightly lower than male
bonuses, at $234.48 thousand versus $303.88 thousand respectively. Moreover, total
compensation, as reported in EXECUCOMP, is nearly identical for the two genders. See
Figure 4 for an illustration.

Figure 4: CEO Compensation Similarities

However, there are some interesting differences in compensation between
genders. Interestingly, both equity incentive plan and fair value of options are higher for
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male CEOs. This is especially interesting in light of the aforementioned fact that female
CEOs typically own a higher percentage of outstanding shares. In addition, “all other
compensation” was much higher for male CEOs, with a mean of $244.49 thousand
compared to the female mean of $54.43 thousand. See Figure 5 for an illustration of the
differences between male and female CEOs in the sample.

Figure 5: CEO Compensation Differences

For this matched sample, the differences in firm and executive data are minor.
The explanation of the male and female data samples show that the random sample
methodology is appropriate for this analysis. Minor differences in CEO compensation
would not be taken into account by investors in the market; therefore, these discrepancies
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should not affect firm valuation upon CEO announcement. Our female CEO sample and
matched male sample are appropriate for the event study.
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4. Results
To test my three hypotheses, I perform an event study, conditional on gender, to
estimate the cumulative abnormal return over a 26-day event window—from 15 days
prior to the event to 10 days after the event. An extension of the event window beyond
the norm of generally 7 days—from 3 days prior and 3 days after the event—such as in
Lee and James (2007) and Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009) is most appropriate in
this study because market rationality or irrationality is more likely revealed in a longer
event window. If markets are highly efficient, they may react to rumors of an
announcement or leaked information before the official announcement. On the other
hand, it is possible that the reaction plays out over a few days after the announcement is
made. For dividend-paying firms, I minimized the valuation effects of dividends because
I excluded dividend gains from the returns of those firms.
4.1 Pooled event study
Hypothesis 1: If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then gender bias will not be
evident in the market
This hypothesis follows the research of other event study methodologies by
measuring market reaction to CEO announcements for the entire pooled sample. This
approach is followed by every event study I reference in this paper. Furthermore, the
extant literature is divided on the test results of this hypothesis; see Appendix B for a
summary of papers that accept or reject the existence of gender bias in the market.
I reject Hypothesis 1. To test this hypothesis, I performed a pooled event study for
all female and matched-male CEO announcements for the period of 1992 through 2016.
As I report in Table 2, the CAR for female CEO announcements shows the market
reacted negatively; in this case, a decrease of about 15 basis points within the 26 days
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event window. However, for the same event window, matched-male CEO
announcements garnered positive sentiment in market; in this case, the market reacted
with a 34 basis point increase in CAR.
Furthermore, I perform a mean test of the CAR for both genders to ascertain if
the differences shown in Table 4 are statistically different. As I report in the difference
column of Table 4, the difference between the CARs is statistically significant at the 99
percent level with a difference of male CEO to female CEO announcement of almost 50
basis points.

Table 4: Testing Gender bias in CEO Announcements
A sample of 104 female CEO announcements is compared with a matched sample for
male CEO announcement for the period of 1992 through 2016. This table shows that
gender is priced in the market as company that elect female CEO at an average of 26 days
after such an announcement lose about 50 basis points compared to their pairs that
announce a male as its next CEO. CARs are estimated using the event study
methodology by applying the Fama-French 3 factor model. I perform a mean test and
estimating the Welch degrees of Freedom. Standard-errors are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
Female
mean
mean
CAR
AR
-0.0015
0.000
(0.0013) (0.0056)

Male
mean
mean
CAR
AR
0.0034
0.000
(0.0009) (0.0006)

Difference
N=
100 F
102 M

CAR
0.0049***
(0.0016)

AR
0.0004
(0.0008)

These results indicate that, overall, the market reacts to female CEO
announcements more negatively than it reacts to male CEO announcements. According to
the EMH, these results imply that the market is inefficient because these results reveal a
difference in price, and therefore preferences, based on an irrational bias against female
CEOs. In my test of this hypothesis, I include every female CEO announcement in my
sample between 1992-2016 (n = 100) and every male CEO announcement in the matched
sample (n = 102). With such a large sample size relative to previous papers (see

33

Appendix B), these results convincingly show that the market reacts differently to female
CEO announcements; moreover, the market reacts negatively to announcements of
female versus male CEOs. In Figure 6 I illustrate these hypothesis-test outcomes.

Figure 6: Hypothesis 1 Results

Following Lee and James (2007) and Lucey and Carron (2011), I find that the
market reacts negatively to female CEOs, especially when I measure results against their
male counterparts. In contrast to the findings of Gondhalekar and Dalmia (2007), Martin,
Nishikawa, and Williams (2009), and Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009), I find that
over the entire sample period (of XYZ years), market reactions to female CEOs are
negative. While this finding does not how the bias may change over time and firm size, it
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shows that the bias exists overall. I conclude that, overall, the market reacts negatively to
female CEOs relative to male CEOs.
4.2 Event study with firms grouped by years
Hypothesis 2: If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then gender bias will not be
evident in the market when firms are grouped by years
I generate five distinct year groups for CEO announcements for my sample
between 1992 and 2016 so that I can investigate how, if at all, the bias changes over time.
The results I report in Table 5 lead me to reject Hypothesis 2. These results show that
mean cumulative abnormal returns vary over time. The difference between male mean
CAR and female mean CAR is significant during some, but not all periods; moreover, the
sign of the difference differs.

Table 5: Year Effect: Gender Bias and CEO Announcements
Female CEO announcements are compared with a matched sample for male CEO
announcement for five periods between 1992-2016. CARs are estimated using the event
study methodology by applying the Fama-French 3 factor model. I perform a mean test
and estimating the Welch degrees of Freedom. Standard-errors are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
Female

Male

Difference

Years

mean
CAR

mean
AR

mean
CAR

mean
AR

N=

CAR

AR

19921995

-0.0106
(0.0032)

-0.0010
(0.0020)

-0.0311
(0.0093)

-0.0029
(0.0042)

8 female
5 male

-0.0204**
(0.0099)

-0.0019
(0.0046)

19961999

0.0207
(0.0049)

-0.0003
(0.0023)

0.0391
(0.0043)

0.0027
(0.0027)

7 female
11 male

0.0184**
(0.0065)

0.0030
(0.0034)

20002005

0.0191
(0.0025)

0.0002
(0.0013)

0.0065
(0.0012)

0.0007
(0.0011)

27 female
26 male

-0.0126***
(0.0028)

0.0005
(0.0017)

20062010

-0.0153
(0.0020)

-0.0007
(0.0008)

-0.0144
(0.0029)

-0.0015
0.0006)

28 female
29 male

0.0010
(0.0035)

-0.0009
(0.0011)

20112016

-0.0100
(0.0017)

-0.0007
(0.0008)

0.0102
(0.0021)

0.0002
(0.0009)

30 female
31 male

0.0202***
(0.0027)

0.0009
(0.0013)
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My rejection of Hypothesis 1 indicates that the market reacts differently to female
CEOs over the entire sample. And, my rejection of Hypothesis 2 supports this and goes
further, showing that the bias varies over time. In Table 5, the bias is evident in every
subsample except one. Interestingly, while the cumulative abnormal returns are different
for males and females in nearly every period, the direction of the bias is not consistent. In
Figure 7 I illustrate these hypothesis-test outcomes.

Figure 7: Hypothesis 2 CAR Results

In the first and second subsamples, female CAR is smaller in magnitude than
male CAR. In the third subsample (2000 to 2005), female CAR is more positive than
male CAR. In the fourth subsample (2006 to 2010), there is no significant difference in
CAR by gender. In the fifth subsample (2011 to 2016), female CEO announcements
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induce a negative CAR relative to male announcements, but the two are of similar
magnitude.
For the first subsample (1992 to 1995), both male and female CEO
announcements result in negative cumulative abnormal returns over the 26-day window.
The female CAR of negative 106 basis points is smaller than the male CAR of negative
311 basis points. However, in the second subsample (1996 to 1999), the market reacts
positively to both male and female CEO announcements, but the male CAR increase
from the first to the second subsample is much more dramatic than the female CAR. In
absolute terms, the change in male CAR from the first to the second period is 702 basis
points, while the change in female CAR is only 230 basis points. See Figure 8 for an
illustration of the variation over subsamples.
Figure 8: Hypothesis 2 Results across Time Periods
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In the first and second subsamples, the male CAR reveals much stronger negative
and positive responses, respectively, while the female CAR reveals smaller responses. In
the third subsample (2000 to 2005), female CEO announcements have a larger effect on
CAR than male CEO announcements do; this result is different from those of the first and
second subsamples.
As I illustrate in Figure 6, the market reacted quite differently to male and female
CEOs in the early years of the full sample, while the gap appears to shrink in the latter
years before growing again. To understand this pattern, it is helpful to look at the number
of CEO announcements in each time period. In Figure 9 I illustrate the difference in CAR
and the number of female CEO announcements for each subsample.

Figure 9: CAR Difference and Number of Female CEO Announcements
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While there were just eight female announcements between 1992 and 1995 and
seven between 1996 and 1997, there were 27 female CEO announcements between 2000
and 2005. This large increase in female CEO announcements coincides with a change in
market reaction to the announcements. In Figure 7 I illustrate the CAR difference
between male and female announcements; this difference is highest between 1992 and
1995. As the number of female CEO announcements grows, the difference appears to
shrink until the fourth subsample (2006-2010).
This supports the ideas put forth in Kanter (1977) and Karsten (1994). The gender
bias is relatively pronounced when female CEOs are rare. As the number of female CEOs
grows, the effect of token status should decline. The decline in the CAR difference,
concurrent with an increase in the number in female CEO announcements, supports the
idea that bias changes with the proportion of female announcements. Though, the data
from 2011 to 2016 do not follow the pattern.
4.3 Event Study with firms grouped by size
Hypothesis 3: If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then gender bias will not be
evident in the market when firms are grouped by size

Does firm size matter? The extant literature demonstrates that, in general, it does:
see, for example, Baker and Hall (2004), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), and
Lee (2009). However, on CEO announcements, no papers have considered this effect.
Rather than presume that the Fama-French 3 or 4 factor models intrinsically control for
size, I separate the female and matched male CEO samples into four groups based on the
associated firms’ market capitalizations—that is, firm size. I group firms as follows:
those that comprise the S&P 500 (SP) as coded by EXECUCOMP; those that comprise
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the Mid-Cap (MD) designation; those that comprise the Small-Cap (SM) designation; and
those that do not belong to any of the aforementioned groups (EX). Based on these
groups, I reject Hypothesis 3, because the effect of gender bias varies across firm size.

Table 6: Size Effect: Gender Bias on CEO Announcements
Female CEO announcements are compared with a matched sample for male CEO
announcement for each S&P index between 1992-2016. CARs are estimated using the
event study methodology by applying the Fama-French 3 factor model. I perform a mean
test and estimating the Welch degrees of Freedom. Standard-errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
Female
index

mean
CAR

Male

Difference

mean
AR

mean
CAR

Mean
AR

SP

0.0058
(0.0013)

0.0006
(0.0010)

-0.0130
(0.0063)

-0.0005
(0.0070)

N=
18 F
29
M

CAR

AR

MD

0.0227
(0.0060)

0.0010
(0.0012)

-0.0025
(0.0027)

-0.0009
(0.0091)

12 F
20 M

-0.0252***
(0.0029)

-0.0019
(0.0015)

SM

0.0023
(0.0020)

0.0006
(0.0013)

0.0259
(0.0015)

0.0011
(0.0014)

0.0235***
(0.0025)

0.0006
(0.0019)

EX

-0.0017
(0.0017)

-0.0004
(0.0011)

-0.0043
(0.0064)

-0.0003
(0.0013)

14 F
26 M
40 F
25
M

-0.0026
(0.0021)

0.0001
(0.0018)

-0.0188***
(0.0018)

-0.0011
(0.0013)

Like my results across subsamples, the effect of gender varies across firm size as
well. The difference in mean CAR between genders is significant for all S&P 1500
indices. Firms with the EX code, or firms that are not in the S&P 1500, did not reveal a
statistically significant difference between genders. Over the period 1992 to 2016, there
were 18 usable female CEO announcements and 29 randomly matched male
announcements in the S&P 500 (SP). In this firm size group, female CAR was a positive
58 basis points while male CAR was negative 130 basis points, a difference of 188 basis
points. For the MD sample, the market reacted positively to female CEO announcements
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and negatively to male announcements, with average female CAR equal to 227 basis
points and the average male CAR equal to negative 25 basis points.
Results for SM firms contrast strongly from the results for the other firm-size
groups. For these relatively small firms, male CEO announcements were greeted with a
259 basis point increase in CAR, while CAR equaled just 23 basis points in reaction to
female announcements. In Figures 10 and 11, I summarize mean CAR by gender.

Figure 10: Hypothesis 3 CAR Results

Figure 10 clearly demonstrates that the effect of gender on CAR after a CEO
announcement varies by firm size. For the larger firms, S&P 500 and MidCap 400, the
market reacted positively to female CEOs, while SmallCap male CEOs were greeted far
more positively by the market. The difference in CAR following CEO announcements for
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the smallest firms, those that are not on the major indices, were not statistically
significant.
Figure 11: Hypothesis 3 Results Across Firm Size

In Figure 11 I illustrate how CAR changes with firm size. Female CAR is higher
for both SP and MD indices, but the pattern is starkly reversed for the SM index, where
male CAR is much higher than female CAR.
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5. CEO Performance Analysis
5.1 Introduction
In my event study, I provide evidence that gender bias exists in the sense that the
market’s expectation of a firm’s future performance is conditional on the gender of that
firm’s CEO. Overall, my evidence implies that the market expects female CEOs to
generate relatively low returns. In this section, I test whether such an expectation is
warranted; that is, I answer the fundamental question, “Do female CEOs generate
relatively low returns?” I compare male and female CEO performance for firms in the
same dataset. To do so, I regress return on assets (ROA) on a variety of firm factors that
presumably drive ROA and I include a dummy variable for gender. In this way, I
determine whether returns are conditional on gender. Furthermore, I analyze differences
in the drivers of ROA under male versus female CEO leadership.
In section 2.2 I review the literature on female CEO performance. The general
consensus is that female CEOs are as capable as male CEOs; that is, firm performance is
independent of CEO gender (See, for example, Huang and Kisgen 2013, Deszo and Ross
2008, and Khan and Vieto 2013). Female executives may lead differently, but such
differences do not generally affect firm performance (See, for example, Powell and Ansic
1997, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye 2003, and Khan and Vieto 2013).
Using panel data similar to mine, Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) find that a
higher proportion of female executives—CEO and otherwise—positively affects firm
performance (2006). I follow the authors’ approach and rely on the extant literature for
the drivers of ROA, a common measure of firm performance (See, for example, Amore
and Garofalo 2016 and Khan and Vieto 2013). In my panel regression, the dependent
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variable is firm ROA and the independent variables are the firm-specific drivers of ROA,
for the period 1993 to 2001. Following Deszo and Ross (2008), I include, as independent
variables, the debt-to-asset ratio (DEBT), research-and-development investment (RnD),
the natural log of the market value of the firm (Khan and Vieto 2013), the ratio of cash to
total assets, CASH (because a higher ratio indicates conservatism), invested capital to
assets, ICAP (as a measure of capital investment), and MTOB as a measure of market-tobook value (Huang and Kisgen 2013).
5.2 Data
Because the purpose of this section is to analyze firm performance conditional on
gender, I use my sample of firms from EXECUCOMP and financial information from
COMPUSTAT. Generally speaking, the event study measures bias based on expectations
of future firm performance; in this section, I measure actual firm performance.
Nevertheless, the dataset I use for this analysis differs in some ways from my event study
dataset.
First, for the purpose of this section, I use a panel dataset of firm performance
over time. I analyze performance by the same company for at least five years before the
female CEO is announced, during which time the incumbent CEO is male, and for at
least three years afterwards, when the CEO is female. I drop firms that do not have
adequate or complete information before and after the female CEO began her tenure. My
panel is unbalanced.
Once again, I begin with the full EXECUCOMP dataset, and follow the same
steps as before: I drop observations associated with utilities and financial firms (SIC
codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999); I drop all observations associated with non-CEO
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executives; and I drop all observations associated with firms that had only male CEOs.
Scrubbing the data this way leaves me with the same 156 observations associated with
female CEOs to which I referred earlier in the context of my event study. I drop
observations associated with CEOs announced before 1992 because of inadequate and
inconsistent data; doing so results in a sample size 152 observations (of male to female
firm-leadership transitions). Finally, I combine the EXECUCOMP data with each firm’s
COMPUSTAT financial information.
Next, I drop observations associated with CEOs appointed after January 2014,
because these events do not have three years of post-female-CEO-appointment returns; I
drop 19 appointments based on this filter. Similarly, I drop observations that do not have
financial data available either five years before or the three years after the announcement;
I drop 28 executives based on this filter. Some companies have two female CEOs during
the sample period (1992 to 2016). Because my analysis requires five years of male data
compared with three years of female data, some of companies with two female
appointments do not satisfy my criteria. I drop five CEOs based on these criteria. One
company, HP, remains in the dataset with two female CEOs because both fulfilled the 5year-pre, 3-year-post returns requirement. Furthermore, some firms did not have
sufficient information on COMPUSTAT and, so, I did not include these firms in my
analysis. The final sample includes 53 firms. This means there are 53 male CEOs
succeeded by 53 female CEOs, or a total of 106 executives.
5.3 Model and Methodology
For this analysis, I use panel regression. The dependent variable is return on
assets, or ROA. The general regression model is specified in Equation 6.
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2' = 3 ,

+ 4567869 + : + ;

(6)

Where 2' is the performance measure for firm # at time %; 3 is a vector of the
observable (ROA-driver) variables that vary across firms (that is, #), across time (that is,
%), or some combination of both firms and time; : captures unobserved heterogeneity
across firms; 4 is the coefficient on the dummy variable 567869 that takes the value of 1
if the CEO is female and a value of zero otherwise; ; is an idiosyncratic error that
varies across # and %.
I model the unobserved heterogeneity as fixed effects based on the results of the
Hausman test, with which I reject the null hypothesis that a random-effects specification
is appropriate.
In Model 1, I estimate Equation 6 with firm fixed effects only. In Model 2, I
estimate the equation with both firm and year fixed effects. In Model 3, I estimate male
only (Model 3M) and female only (Model 3F) subsamples to compare performance
across gender; in both cases, I include firm and year fixed effects. In Model 4, I estimate
male only (Model 4M) and female only (Model 4F) subsamples and include only firm
fixed effects.
To determine if CEO gender affects ROA, I test if the coefficient on <=>?=
@4) is significant. To determine if the coefficients on the drivers of firm performance
3,

–namely, R&D, Market Value, Cash, Invested Capital, Debt, and Market to Book

value— are significantly different for male and female CEOs. In Table 7, I report my
regression results.
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Table 7: Regression Results
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5.4 Results
In Table 7, I report that gender has no significant effect on ROA. In Model 1, the
coefficient estimate for <=>?= @4) is negative and significant; however, this model
includes only firm (as opposed to firm and year) fixed effects. Because the effects of time
are likely to be non-random, fixed effects for both firm and year are appropriate and
necessary. Model 2 shows that including year fixed effects causes the gender variable to
be insignificant. When correctly specified, the model indicates that CEO gender cannot
explain any movement in ROA.
While gender has no effect on ROA, as I report in Table 7, several coefficient
estimates on the conventional drivers of ROA are significant, implying that several
factors drive ROA across my models. R&D, a measure of research and development
costs to total assets, is significant in every regression. In Model 2, R&D is significant and
has a negative effect on returns. In the male-subsample regressions, the coefficients for
R&D are -1.319 (Model 3M) and -1.340 (Model 4M). In the female-subsample
regressions, the coefficients are -0.949 (Model 3F) and -0.962 (Model 4F). R&D
expenditures under the leadership of a male CEO are significantly different from those
under the leadership of a female CEO. Specifically, the effect of R&D expenditure on
returns is larger in absolute value during a male CEO’s tenure than during a female
CEO’s tenure.
Similarly, the log market value variable, LNMV, is significant in all regressions.
The coefficient estimates for the male subsamples are 0.0209 (3M) and 0.0266 (4M),
while the coefficient estimates for the female subsamples are 0.0312 (Model 3F) and
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0.0636 (Model 4F). These male and female coefficient estimates are significantly
different from one another at the 99 percent level in every regression model.
Specifically, the effect of market value on ROA is larger when a female is CEO.
ICAP is only significant at the 90 percent level in one female-subsample
regression, Model 3F. This indicates that invested capital likely has little or no significant
effect on returns for either gender subsample. Similarly, CASH is significant in only
Model 3F. It is significant at the 99 percent level, indicating that cash holdings may affect
returns when a CEO is female. CASH represents cash to total assets, ROA is more
sensitive to cash on hand when a female is CEO and both firm and year fixed effects are
included in the model. Therefore, both ICAP and CASH are insignificant drivers of ROA
for male subsamples, but may play a role in explaining returns for female subsamples.
Interestingly, debt is only significant in regressions with male executives
included: that is, debt is significant at the 99 percent level in Models 1 and 2, and the
male-subsample regressions. The estimates imply that male executives’ use of debt
explains some movement in ROA: the coefficient varies between -0.160 and -0.218. The
variable MTOB varies in significance; it is significant at the 99 percent level only in
Model 3M, or the male-subsample regression with firm and year fixed effects.
Based on these results, I conclude that gender does not affect firm performance.
R&D expenditure and market value have the greatest effects on ROA, while invested
capital, debt, and cash on hand have relatively weak effects. These findings, in context of
the event study results, indicate that market perception of female CEO performance is
both irrational and inefficient.
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6. Discussion, implications, and questions for further research
As suspected, market reaction to female CEO announcements changes over time
and with firm size. My findings are in line with those of Lee and James (2007) and
Lucey and Carron (2011), who find that the market reacts negatively to female CEO
announcements relative to male CEO announcements overall. However, my breakdown
of the data by time periods and by firm size allows me to segment the gender effect and
study its effect on cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, my findings go further than the
results of earlier work in this field.
My rejection of Hypothesis 1 notes that, overall, female CEOs are reacted to
negatively by the market. Within the 26-day window surrounding the event, cumulative
abnormal returns for female announcements were negative, while the cumulative
abnormal return for matched male announcements were positive. This finding directly
supports those of Lee and James (2007) and Lucey and Carron (2011) and contradicts
those of Gondhalekar and Dalmia (2007), Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009), and
Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009), who all found no difference.
My rejection of Hypotheses 2 and 3 contribute significantly to the extant
literature. To my knowledge, no study has analyzed the effect of gender over time or by
firm size. My relatively large sample size allowed me to perform separate event studies
for five time periods and four firm-size categories. The comparison of these results is
especially important for the field because it shows that bias is dynamic and varies across
firm sizes. Revealed bias in the market over time fluctuates greatly; the effect of gender
on CAR was especially significant in the periods from 1992 to 1995 and 1996 to 1999.
The third period corresponded to a significant increase in female CEOs; at the same time,
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the bias measured by CAR seemed to decrease. Before 2000, male CEO announcements
created large fluctuations in returns and the effect of female announcements was much
smaller. After 2000, female CEO announcements were greeted with a CAR of a similar
magnitude to that associated with male CEO announcements.
Furthermore, female CEOs for larger firms are greeted more positively by the
market than were their male peers. One reason for this could be the effect of public CEO
announcements. The largest companies have highly publicized corporate announcements,
so the market may have access to more information about the new CEO. Increased
information about the previous experience and qualifications could mitigate the
stereotyping and information problems that cause gender bias. For small firms,
announcements often take the form of one-line press releases. This could mean that the
market sees nothing but a woman’s name; the market may be more likely to generalize
and make biased assumptions about her ability. Further research into this question could
elucidate why the gender difference varies across firm size.
My comparison of female-to-male CEO performance for the same company
concludes that gender has no effect on returns; thus, the perceived difference in gender
upon CEO announcement is irrational and inefficient. This finding supports the idea that
while male and female executives may have some differences in risk preference and
investment style, the gender of the CEO has no bearing on the returns of the firm. The
results of the event study indicate that the market expects performance to be conditional
on gender and this assumption is incorrect.
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6.1 Implications
The broader impact of this research is not simply to demonstrate whether or not
financial markets are efficient; they are not. According to my work in this thesis, market
participants systematically misperceive the capabilities of female CEOs. Rather the
broader impact is to compel society to solve the social problem of gender bias (in
corporate leadership and everywhere else).
Many people—financial-market participants included—deny that gender bias
exists. Indeed, my thesis is motivated by the widely held assumption that markets are
generally efficient and, thus, rational investors equipped with all extant and accurate
information, do not generally err systematically on, say, the basis of gender. The first
step to eliminating this inefficiency—and the misallocation of capital it necessarily
provokes—is to own up to it.
As I explain in my literature review, the proximate cause of gender bias is
tokenism. Token theory explains why investors perceive women to be less capable than
men as corporate leaders. Karsten suggests that, to shed their token status, a minority
group must grow to at least 35-40 percent of the total population (1994). Thus, to
eliminate gender bias caused by the paucity of female corporate leaders, more women
must ascend to such roles. The reasons why women have not done so are, of course,
deeply institutionalized. And, to make matters worse, affirmative actions to address the
problem may inadvertently contribute to it (Heilman, Block, and Stathatos 1997).
So, the problem remains. Female CEOs are rare. Because they are rare, the market
misperceives them as different from male CEOs. If there were more female CEOs, this
misperception might abate. However, women are not likely to ascend to CEO if the
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market misperceives them as less capable. This negative feedback loop is seemingly
impossible to break; it is not. I propose a two-pronged approach. One, investors admit to
their irrational bias (and, thus, correct it before it effectively misallocates financial
capital). And two, firms implement hiring practices that empower women, thus
cultivating a corporate culture that does not favor male-centric behavioral stereotypes in
leadership roles.
6.2 Questions for further research
Although my study benefited from a larger sample of data, the small number of
female CEOs still limits research in this field. This is both the motivation for this research
and its biggest limitation. As time passes and more females are appointed to CEO
positions, researchers will gain context. Trends will reveal themselves over time, and bias
is easier to measure in retrospect. As I mentioned in the implications section, bias should
abate over time as more female CEOs are appointed. Therefore, the time-period
methodology that I use in this paper could be extended in the future. Measuring how the
bias changes over time is a valuable way to gain insight into why it exists and the
mechanisms through which it manifests.
In addition, this research included multiple contributions at once. Future research
could compare the individual explanatory power of each. For example, I could utilize the
extended event window with an older sample; measure the event study with the small
sample window and my larger dataset; etc. Furthermore, I employ a semi-randomly
matched male sample. In future research, I hope to utilize propensity score matching
methodology to determine if results are conditional on matching methodology.
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Finally, linguistic analysis of CEO announcements could shed light on market
misperceptions of female CEO ability. My event study shows that the market reacts
differently to female CEOs; my performance analysis shows that returns are not
dependent on gender. Analyzing the announcements themselves could indicate whether
the published information implies anything about future CEO performance. It is possible
that press releases use gendered language and phrasing that may cause the market to
stereotype the female CEO, contributing to gender-conditional perception of ability.
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7. Conclusion
Gender bias is incredibly difficult to study. Because implicit bias may exist
unrecognized even by the individual, it is critical to find the correct mechanism to study
this irrational perception. In my theoretical framework in this thesis, I use the
sociological theory of tokenism and gender bias as well as the Efficient Market
Hypothesis to understand how firm returns can reflect investor expectations of female
CEOs. Because the EMH asserts that investors act rationally based on all available
information, I propose three hypotheses based on market efficiency. Furthermore, I find
that returns are independent of CEO gender.
I contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, I study a larger sample
size of female CEOs than previous studies do. Second, I use an extended event study
window similar to that of Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer (2009). Finally, I conduct event
studies in three different ways: by full sample, over time periods, and by firm size.
Furthermore, I compare actual male and female performance for these firms, and show
that CEO gender has no affect on firm performance.
By studying stock market reactions to CEO announcements through cumulative
abnormal returns, I show that gender bias does indeed exist in financial markets. I reject
the first hypothesis, concluding that gender bias is evident in the market when the sample
is analyzed as a whole. I reject the second hypothesis, concluding that gender bias is
evident in the market when firms are grouped by years. Gender bias is evident in nearly
every year grouping; moreover, the bias varies over time. Then, I reject the third
hypothesis, concluding that gender bias is evident in the market when firms are grouped
by size. The bias varies across firm sizes, and female CEOs are reacted to most positively
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when they are heading large firms. Finally, I demonstrate that returns are not conditional
on gender, concluding that market perception of women is based on incorrect
assumptions, not rational expectations of future performance.
While gender bias is inherently difficult to study because of the small number of
female CEOs, there remain opportunities for future research. There are more female
executives now than ever before, and female CEO announcements are more common. My
empirical findings support the idea that token status, or rarity, causes markets to react
negatively. While this is currently a problem, because there are still relatively few female
CEOs, it could be ameliorated in the future. If female CEOs grow more common, the bias
should decrease accordingly. To close, I propose two ways to solve the problem of
gender bias in the corporate world.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Summary of comparative performance literature
Author

Year

Female n=

Data

Methodology

Findings

Powell
and Ansic

1997

unspecified

experiment

psychological
experiment

females more
risk averse
male and
female
similar
behavior

Atkinson,
Baird, and
Frye

2003

72

Principia

one and three index
models

Wolfers,
Justin

2006

64

S&P

portfolio analysis

no difference

S&P

regression

males
overconfident
relative to
females

S&P

portfolio method,
risk-adjusted
returns

females
underperform
relative to
risk

Dezső and
Ross.

Kolev

Huang
and
Kisgen

2008

2012

2013

firm-years,
unspecified

64

116

S&P

males
measures of risk
overconfident
aversion/confidence
relative to
females

Khan and
Vieito

2013

141

S&P

OLS

females risk
averse, better
firm
performance

Faccio,
Marchica,
and Mura.

2016

firm-years,
unspecified

Amadaeus
250,000

use a variety of
matching types

females more
risk-averse

Amore
and
Garofalo

2016

firm-years,
unspecified

S&P

OLS

females more
risk averse
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Appendix B: Summary of existing event study results
Author

Lee and
James

Gondhalekar
and Dalmia

Martin,
Nishikawa,
and Williams

Coxbill,
Sanning, and
Shaffer

Lucey and
Carron

Year

2007

2007

2009

2009

2011

Female
n=

Data

Methodology

Findings

17

S&P

event study:
standard,
convenience
sample

negative
difference

50

Russell
3000

event study:
Fama-French 3factor model,
random sample

no difference

S&P

event study:
single index
market model,
matched sample

no difference

S&P

event study:
market, market
adjusted, and
Fama-French 3factor model

no difference

event study:
CAPM, random
sample

negative
difference for
female CEO and
executive
director
appointments

70

33

77

FTSE
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Appendix C: EXECUCOMP Abbreviations
Term
salary

Abbreviation
salary

bonus

bonus

age

age

total compensation

tdc1

length
all other
compensation

allothtot

change CEO
payment

chgctrlpmt

equity incentive
plan value

eip-unearn_val

fair value of options

option_awards_F
V

executive director

execdir

other compensation

othcomp

value of stock
awards
pct. of total shares
outstanding
estimated
termination
payment
percent increase in
salary
total compensation
in SEC filing

stockawards
shrown_tot_pct
term_pmt
sal_pct
total SEC

Definition
base salary, in thousands
bonus earned during the fiscal year, in
thousands
age as reported
Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus +
Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants +
LTIP Payouts + All Other +Value of
Options) in thousands
calculated - prior years of service with
company
All other unspecified compensation,
including signing bonuses, life insurance
premiums, debt forgiveness, 401k
contributions. Valued in thousands
estimated payment in case of termination
to change control in thousands
value of performance-based shares, in
thousands
fair value of options awarded in the fiscal
year, valued in thousands
Dummy variable - serves as executive
director (1) otherwise (0)
other compensation benefits like tax
reimbursements,discounted stock
purchases, gross ups, etc valued in
thousands
value of all non-option stock awards in
thousands
percent ownership of outstanding shares
(if greater than 1%)
estimated payment in case of involuntary
termination, in thousands
percentage increase in salary from yearto-year
total compensation reported in SEC
filings, in thousands

